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Abstract 
 
Professional baseball has experienced numerous work-stoppages over the last 30 years, 
including three which resulted in the cancellation of games.  Existing estimates of the 
demand for attendance at Major League Baseball games has found that only those events 
which caused the loss of games influenced attendance.  This paper revisits the issue of 
whether strikes affect attendance and finds that even those lockouts and strikes that do 
not cause games to be canceled are associated with significantly lower attendance.  
Moreover, despite dramatic differences in the severity of the three strikes that canceled 
games, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects are the same.  Finally, the 
evidence here suggests that attendance is adversely affected by events leading up to 
negotiation of a new Basic Agreement between the players and the owners.   3 
Professional baseball narrowly averted a work stoppage during the 2002 season.  That a 
strike was avoided is surprising if one realizes that since the players organized for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in the mid-1960's, every time an agreement between the 
players and owners expired some sort of work stoppage followed.  The 1994-95 work-
stoppage is undoubtedly the most severe sports labor disruption to date. Not only did it 
result in the cancellation of the last third of the 1994 season, including the playoffs and 
the World Series, but it spilled over into the 1995 season. Yet it still took more than 6 
months after the expiration of the agreement signed to end that strike, and a date being set 
for another strike to begin, before the Major League Baseball Players Association and 
Major League Baseball settled on a new contract. 
  Over time the issues between the players and the owners have varied, though the 
basic problem has been the same.  Owners want players to have less freedom to sell their 
services on the open market, players want more freedom to do so.  Consequently, battles 
have been fought, and largely won by the players, for the right to salary arbitration, and 
for free agency.  The owners have tried to soften the blow of salary arbitration and free 
agency.  They have sought to lengthen the number of years of service a player must have 
before being eligible for arbitration or free agency, they have tried to impose high costs 
on teams that sign top-line free agents, and they have sought salary caps.
1  
This paper is not about the labor-management issues per se, but is about the 
effects of these disputes on attendance at major league ball-parks.  Owners and players 
alike need to understand the consequences of their actions, particularly since it is 
ultimately the fans that pay the bills.  In this paper we estimate the relationship between 
                                                 
1Zimbalist (1992) provides an excellent history of labor-management relations from the 1870s 
until 1992.   4 
average attendance per major league baseball game for each team  over the period 1969 
to 1996.  In other words, we have a cross section-time series data set in which the 
dependent variable is the average attendance at major league baseball games of a given 
team in a specific year.  After controlling for ticket prices, incomes, populations, quality 
of play and players, and lagged attendance per game, we estimate the effect on attendance 
per game of strikes or lockouts.  Existing work on the effects of labor unrest in baseball 
would suggest that the lack of a strike in 2002 meant there was no impact of the discord 
on attendance.  This paper raises doubts about that conclusion.   
It seems obvious that all strikes and lockouts are not the same.  For example, the 
strikes that have occurred in baseball since 1969 have varied in duration and in severity.  
The first instance of a baseball strike was in 1969.  In this case, spring training was 
delayed but the regular season and post-season went off as planned.  The strikes of 1972, 
1981, and 1994-95 are the only incidents that resulted in lost games.  In 1972, the players 
struck for 13 days, and 86 games were lost.  The strike of 1981 lasted for 50 days and 
about 700 games were lost.  The strike of 1994 put an end to the season, resulted in the 
cancellation of the playoffs and the World Series, and delayed the start of the 1995 
season.  In all, the strike lasted 232 days and resulted in 920 games being canceled. 
Sprinkled throughout the period are strikes or lockouts in 1973, 1976, 1980, 1985, and 
1990 which lasted for various lengths of time ranging from 2 days, in 1985, to 32 days, in 
1990, but which did not cause any games to be canceled. We find that these strikes and 
lockouts did not all result in the same repercussions at the gate.
2  
                                                 
2Coates and Humphreys (2002) show that strikes and lockouts have no discernible effect on the economies 
of the cities the franchises call home.   5 
On the other hand, we find some surprising similarities across the different 
strikes. Attendance appears to follow the same time path from one strike to the next, for 
example, and for the 1972 and 1981 strikes the affects are not statistically different from 
one another.  These strikes are found to have generated equal reductions in per game 
attendance of about 10 to 12% while the 1994-95 strike caused about a 24% reduction.  
We also find that despite having no effect on the number of games played, the events in 
1973, 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1990 generate statistically significant reductions in season 
attendance of between 3 to 7%.  In those instances, players were "locked out" or walked 
out on strike.  The question this raises is whether labor management discord that does not 
include a work-stoppage, like the 2002 situation, results in lost attendance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly describes 
the literature on demand for attendance.  This paper fits squarely into that literature, but 
while our emphasis is not on income and price elasticities of demand for attendance, we 
do produce evidence on the size of those important concepts.  The best measure of price 
is a matter of some debate in the literature, and one of the technical issues addressed here.  
We follow the literature review with a discussion of the data set and the estimation 
scheme.  The results are reported and discussed in the fourth section and we conclude 
with a brief summary. 
 
Attendance literature 
Because attendance is a major source of revenue for all sports teams, modeling 
the demand for attendance is an integral part of sports economics. The two earliest 
attendance models were done in the 1970s  (Demmert 1973; Noll 1974).   Neither   6 
examined the effects of strikes, but each found the effects of ticket prices to be 
problematic.  The appropriate measure of ticket prices is an issue in the literature to 
which this paper will make a contribution.  
The attendance models published since Demmert's and Noll's seminal papers have 
generally included data about population characteristics, stadium characteristics, and the 
availability of substitutes as well as price and team quality data.
3  Some have focused on 
special issues.
4  One such special issue is the topic of this paper, the effects of baseball 
strikes and lockouts on attendance.   
Coffin (1996) introduces dummy variables for the strike years of 1972 and 1981 
with team annual attendance as the dependent variable.  His estimates indicate that the 
strike in 1972 had little impact on attendance in that year, but that per team attendance 
was down by over 700,000 as a consequence of the 1981 strike.  However, since the 1981 
strike lasted 50 days and cost over 700 games, finding attendance per team significantly 
lower in that year than in other years is not at all surprising.  Coffin did not attempt to 
assess the extent to which the effects of the strikes carried over into other years.  Schmidt 
and Berri (2002; 2004) address exactly that issue. 
Using a time-series of aggregate attendance for MLB, Schmidt and Berri (2002; 
2004) test for the impact of the strikes in 1981 and 1994-95.  Their base model does not 
include any behavioral variables to explain attendance demand, but simply focuses on the 
stability of the time-series.  They find, not unexpectedly, that attendance was harmed by 
                                                 
3 Examples of such studies include the Demmert (1973), and  Noll (1974) studies mentioned above as well 
as work by Siegfried and Eisenberg (1980), Coffin (1996) and Bruggink and Eaton (1996).   
4  For example, Kahane and Shmanske  (1997) examine the effects of roster instability on attendance.  
Schmidt and Berri  (2001) consider the effects of competitive balance, Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert 
(1992) look for the effect of uncertainty of outcome, and Domazlicky and Kerr (1990) examine the role of 
the designated hitter rule. 
   7 
the strikes in 1981 and 1994-95, but they also find that attendance recovers from the 
effects of those strikes in the next year.  They (2002) find that other episodes of labor-
management unrest have no effect on attendance, either in the season in which they occur 
or in any other seasons.  Indeed, the only other non-random influences on attendance are 
the post-World War II shock that makes attendance 20% larger than it had been 
previously and the National League expansion in 1993. 
  The existing evidence on the effects of strikes in professional baseball is, 
apparently, clear.  Both Coffin (1996) and Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004) find that the 
1981 strike lowered attendance, and Schmidt and Berri find that the 1994-95 strike did as 
well.  The effects found by Schmidt and Berri are substantial, 30% in 1981 and 35% in 
1994-95.  However, Schmidt and Berri's results indicate that those effects are short lived, 
as they do not appear to carry over into the subsequent season.  No previous research has 
found any impact of the strikes or lockouts that cancelled no games. 
 
Discussion of Data 
The attendance data used in this paper follows each franchise in the United States from 
1969 until 1996, including franchises that move and franchises that come into existence 
through expansion.  This means that two franchises, the Montreal Expos and the Toronto 
Blue Jays, are omitted from the analysis.  The attendance variable is the attendance per 
game for an individual team averaged over the entire season.  Various approaches have 
been taken in the literature, some researchers using per game or annual attendance by 
team (Demmert 1973; Noll 1974; Coffin 1996;  Kahane 1997), some using game by 
game attendance across a season(Bruggink and Eaton1996), and still others using league-
wide annual attendance per team (Schmidt and Berri 2002; 2004).  Each approach has its   8 
advantages and disadvantages.  The approach taken here, to use annual attendance per 
game for each team, allows us to test a fully specified demand for attendance using ticket 
prices that vary cross-sectionally and over time.  The primary question of this paper is 
whether demand for attendance is affected by labor unrest, that is, whether the demand 
function is shifted as a result of strikes and lockouts. To answer this question requires a 
fully specified demand function.
5  
A difficulty with specifying this demand function is that no ticket price series 
exists for each team through the entire period.  For this reason, several alternative 
regressions are estimated, each using different price data. The sample period ends with 
1996 rather than continuing until 2000 and beyond because the one ticket price series 
available after 1990 is not constructed the same before and after 1996.  Specifically, in 
1997 and after the prices are constructed including luxury boxes whereas before 1996 
luxury boxes are not included.
6   
Researchers estimating attendance models for Major League Baseball have two choices 
for the price variable.  One is to construct an average ticket price using a seating chart 
and price schedule to calculate the weighted-average price of available seating.  This type 
price variable is available for the period from 1969 to 1988.  The other price option is to 
divide each team’s gate receipts by its total attendance.  Such a variable is available for 
                                                 
5 An additional issue, raised by a referee, is whether early season strikes and late season strikes differ in 
their impact on average attendance because early season games have lower attendance than late season 
games so losing them would have a smaller impact on the average than would losing the late season games.  
This is an interesting possibility and is more fully addressed below.   
6 Moreover, pricing behavior seems quite different after 1996.  For example, between 1992 and 1993 only 4 
teams raised prices by more than $1 on average, between 1993 and 1994, 12 teams did so with three of 
them raising average price by more than $2. Two of the teams that raised price by more than $2 opened 
new stadiums that year.  Between 1996 and 1997, 12 teams raised prices more than $1, and five of them 
raised price by more than $2.  Only one franchise opened a new stadium that year.  Finally, between 1997 
and 1998, 16 teams raised price more than $1, 11 of those by more than $2, 6 of those by more than $3, and 
3 by more than $4. 
   9 
the period 1990 through 1996.  The latter method can be considered the “actualized” 
average ticket price.  Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages and their 
proponents and detractors.  The bottom line of this debate is that either the ticket price is 
measured with error or it is endogenous.  In either case, an appropriate estimation 
technique to control for the data problem is instrumental variables regression.  
Consequently, we use IV techniques, and this enables us to assess which type price 
variable works best in the estimation of attendance.   
The raw price variable for the period 1990 to 1996 was constructed using the gate 
receipt data from Rodney Fort’s MLB Business Pages website and the total attendance 
for each team for each year.
7  The nominal average ticket prices are deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index using a base year of 1983.  This variable is called GATE. 
  The price variable for the earlier period, 1969 through 1988, comes from two 
sources, Doug Pappas's Business of Baseball website
8 and Roger Noll's price series 
available on Rodney Fort's web page.  Both Pappas and Noll use the seating-chart method 
to construct the price variable, and their prices are very similar.  The correlation 
coefficient is about 0.92.  The problem is that neither series is complete for the full period 
1969 through 1988.  Pappas's data is complete for the early 1970s, but has a gap from 
1986 through 1991, while Noll's series has a gap between 1971 and 1975 and is not 
constructed at all for before 1971. Noll's data extends through 1988.  We have done the 
analysis on the period 1969 to 1985, so that we have a consistent price series, but we also 
constructed a price variable from the Pappas and Noll variables to extend the coverage 
                                                 
7 The url for this website is http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/MLB/MLBFrame.htm. 
8 The url for Pappas' website is http://roadsidephotos.com/baseball/index.htm .   10 
through 1988.
9  We took the average of the average seat price variables from Pappas and 
Noll whenever both were available, and used the one that existed whenever only one 
exists.   The Pappas variable is called SEAT, the constructed price is NOLL-PAPPAS.  
Other variables  in the demand equation include population (POP) and real per 
capita personal income (REAL INC).  The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
population is available for all of the areas that had a Major League Baseball team.
10  It is 
also  common in the literature on  attendance demand to include the percent of the 
population that  is black (PCTBLACK) and one paper (1996) also uses the percent of 
population that is Hispanic (PCTHISP).  We use each of these variables as a regressor. 
Variables that account for the history of the franchise are also commonly used in 
attendance demand models.  We use the age of each franchise (TEAM AGE) to capture 
the effect of having a long  history in a city as well as the novelty effect of having an 
expansion team in a city.  Additionally, we control for the effects of the quality of the 
stadium using its age (STAD AGE) and a dummy variable indicating if that stadium is in 
its last year of operation (LAST YEAR). We hypothesize that younger parks will have 
greater attendance, all other things constant, than older parks, so we expect the stadium 
age variable will have a negative coefficient.
11  However, in the last year a stadium is in 
                                                 
9 We do not use the Pappas variable for the period 1991 through 1996, which he gets from the Team 
Marketing Report, because when these years are added, the estimation of the price elasticity deteriorates.  
The values in the Pappas price series jump dramatically from 1985 to 1991, and even from 1988, the end of 
the Noll series, to 1991.  Because these prices seem so different, and because the estimation results 
deteriorate, we do not report results when using the 1991 through 1996 Pappas prices.  We do not use these 
data for the period after 1996 because the computation changes in 1997 to include club seating. 
10 There are some approximations necessary as the SMSA does not perfectly coincide with the market area 
of the teams.  For example, the Texas Rangers (Arlington) and the California/Anaheim Angels (Anaheim) 
play in SMSAs that may not be completely indicative of their market.   In order to account for this 
discrepancy, the Angels’ population data is from the Orange County SMSA while the Rangers' comes from 
the Dallas SMSA.  Real per capita personal income also comes from the SMSAs. 
11The stadium age variable is not a perfect control for the effects we want to capture.  Possible alternative 
variables are dummies indicating the stadium has opened recently or some other sort of indicator of 
novelty.  We avoid these variables because they are highly subjective (how does one decide how long the   11 
operation, we expect attendance to be greater, all other things equal, as fans express 
nostalgia for the old park.  One important factor that must be held constant to find the 
effects hypothesized for stadium age and last year of operation is the capacity of the 
stadium.  Consequently, stadium capacity is included as an explanatory variable 
(CAPACITY).   
Models of attendance demand also control for the quality of the team, both via its 
success on the field and through the abilities of its players.  We control for the success of 
a team using winning percentage in the current season (WIN PCT) and in the previous 
season, and by a dummy variable indicating appearance in the playoffs in the previous 
season (LAG PLAYOFF).
12  Although a team’s winning percentage at the end of the 
season is not known until the season is over, it is a reasonable proxy for the team’s 
performance throughout the season.  Last season’s winning percentage (LAGWIN PCT) 
and playoff experience proxy for fans’ expectations for the coming year and the decision 
to buy season tickets.  Greater values of either winning percentage variable and playoff 
participation are expected to raise attendance in the current season.   
                                                                                                                                                 
novelty effect lasts?) and, consequently, less intuitive.  A case-in-point is Coffin’s (1996) attendance study 
which uses a variable that begins at 4 in the first year a stadium is open and declines by one each year until 
it reaches zero in the fifth and every subsequent year after the facility opens. His justification is that 
“[f]ollowing some experimentation … [this method] led to the best results” (p.38) and the approach clearly 
addresses the issue of "novelty" effects.  However, the age of stadiums affects attendance in more ways 
than simply as a novelty.  Aging stadiums are less comfortable and offer fewer amenities than newer 
facilities.  The experience of the trip to the ballpark is less satisfying in a decrepit facility than in a modern 
one, even after novelty effects are controlled for, so a variable like Coffin's misses important determinants 
of attendance.  
 
12 For expansion teams we substitute the contemporaneous winning percentage for the lagged winning 
percentage. We assume that actual winning percentages of expansion franchises are reasonably close to 
what their fans expected them to be going into their inaugural seasons.  For example, for the inaugural 
season of the Seattle Mariners, the lagged winning percentage is set equal to the actual winning percentage 
of the Seattle Pilots expansion team from 1969.  The Mariners won 35% of their games in 1977, while the 
Pilots won 39.5 percent of their games in their first, and only, season of play.   12 
If two baseball teams have the same record, same size market, etc., but one has a 
superstar and the other does not, the team with the star would be expected to draw more 
fans.  We capture the prowess of the players on a roster with two variables, all-time All-
Stars (AAS) and BLACK INK.  All-time All Stars is developed from t he website 
Baseball-Reference.com which counts the number of players that were ever on an All-
Star roster that are on a team in a given season.  “Black ink” is a term used by Baseball-
Reference.com that means a player led the league in a category.
13  The black ink variable 
used here includes more than just league leaders.  It is calculated as the number of times, 
in a given season, players from each team show up in the top ten of their league’s leader 
boards for the following statistics: batting average, home runs, runs batted in, wins, 
earned run average, and pitcher strikeouts.    Admittedly, these variables are not perfect 
measures of the ability of star players to attract fans, but they are objective and should be 
a good proxy of the overall star power on a team.   
  The focus of this paper is on the effects of strikes and lock outs in Major League 
Baseball on attendance.  These events are accounted for in three ways.  First, strikes and 
lockouts that result in no games being cancelled are lumped together in one variable.  
Three of these occurred during spring training (1973, 1976, and 1990), and the 1980 
event occurred in May, leaving the vast majority of the season to play after the strike.  
Consequently, if these events had any effect on attendance per game it is most likely that 
affect is spread throughout the entire season.  The one exception is the strike of 1985 that 
took place in August.  Because this strike occurred during the period of relatively high 
demand, its effects on attendance may differ from those of the other events that did not 
                                                 
13 Baseball encyclopedias and baseball cards tend to highlight league-leading statistics with boldface—
hence the term “black ink.”     13 
cause the loss of any games.  Nonetheless,  for each of these seasons the  variable 
LOCKOUT takes the value one, and in all other seasons the lockout variable is zero.  An 
assessment of the differential impact of 1985 is discussed below. 
A second set of variables is four indicators, one for each of the year of the strike 
and the three following years for those three strikes which resulted in the loss of regular 
season games, 1972, 1981, and 1994-95.  These variables are STRIKE1, STRIKE2, 
STRIKE3, and STRIKE4.  The choice to highlight the year of the strike and the three 
succeeding years recognizes the fact that each strike or lockout occurred at the expiration 
of a Basic Agreement, and the variables correspond to the three year length of the typical 
Basic Agreement between the MLBPA and the owners.  In addition, the examination of 
subsequent years allows one to assess whether the effects of the strike spill over into the 
following seasons and, in the case of STRIKE4, whether fans may stay away as reports of 
the impending labor dispute spread as the expiration date of the Basic Agreement nears.  
For example, the players struck in 1972. STRIKE1 equals 1 for 1972.  STRIKE2 
equals 1 for 1973 and identifies the first year under a new Basic Agreement, STRIKE3 
equals 1 in 1974 the second year under the agreement, and STRIKE4 equals 1 in 1975, 
the third, and final, year under the Basic Agreement.  Summing up the strike variables, 
STRIKE1 equals 1 in 1972, 1981, and 1995; STRIKE2 equals 1 in 1973, 1982, and 1996; 
STRIKE3 equals 1 in 1974 and 1983; and STRIKE4 equals 1 in 1975 and 1984.
  14  
STRIKE3 and STRIKE4 are not equal to one in 1997 and 1998, respectively, because 
those years are not in the data for the reasons outlined above. 
                                                 
14 We also estimated the model with STRIKE1 equal to one in 1994, STRIKE2 equal to 1 in 1995, and each 
variable zero otherwise.  The results are nearly identical to those reported here and are available upon 
request.   14 
These three strikes may have vastly different effects. Moreover, the 1985 strike 
may differ from the other LOCKOUT years. The strike of 1972  lasted 13 days and 
resulted in the loss of 86 games.  The strike of 1981 was much more severe, lasting for 50 
days and causing 712 games to be lost. Most severe of all is the strike of 1994-95 which 
resulted in the loss of  920  games  spread over  the 1994 and 1995 seasons and the 
cancellation of the 1994 playoffs and World Series.
15   The games lost as a result of the 
1981 and 1994-95 strikes amount to 25 and 33 percent of the regular season schedule.  
The 86 games lost in 1972 is an order of magnitude smaller.
16 
To allow for the possibility that the effect of the strike in 1972 may be different 
from the strike in 1981 and 1995, both because of the differences in severity and because 
of the possibility that the early season 1972 strike is unlike the mid and late season strikes 
of 1981 and 1994-95, we also estimate the model with dummy variables that indicate 
each year individually, as well as each of the succeeding three years.
17  The use of these 
year dummy  variables to indicate the strike year and the following years inherently 
reflects the effects of the trends in per game attendance confounding the interpretation of 
these variables as strike effects.  In a regression that includes a dummy variable for each 
of 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984, which enables one to assess if 
the effect on attendance is the same in  corresponding years across  both strikes, the 
                                                 
15 The result was to lose 52 days from the 1994 season and 25 days from the 1995 season.  Zimbalist (2003) 
says that 938 games were lost from the regular season schedule.  The 920 lost games comes from (2002). 
16 An alternative approach is to use the number of games lost, per team, as a regressor.  In most years this 
variable is zero, but in strike years it is the number of games lost divided by the number of teams.  This 
approach produces very similar results as the approach reported on below.  Moreover, if the STRIKE1, 
STRIKE2, STRIKE3, and STRIKE4 variables are regressors along with this games lost variable, the former 
carry coefficients and t-statistics like those reported below, while the latter is not remotely statistically 
significant.  These results are available upon request. 
17 We also included a dummy variable for 1985.  That variable was rarely significant and uniformly 
positive, suggesting that the 1985 strike in early August was not different from the other strikes and 
lockouts from which no games were lost.   15 
variables may behave very much like a non-linear time trend.  To control for this, the 
analysis includes the lagged value of the per game attendance as an explanatory variable 
(LAGATT_G).  Inclusion of the lagged dependent variable raises the question of stability 
of the model.  Unit root tests, whether the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
equal to 1, soundly reject the null hypothesis.  Schmidt and Berri  (2002) reach a similar 
conclusion on annual league-wide attendance data. 
One l ast set of variables used in the analysis must be discussed.  The 
measurement error and endogeneity issues with the ticket price variables suggest use of 
an instrumental variables technique.  We use city specific dummy variables in a first 
stage regression, along with the stadium, player and demographic variables described 
above, to predict the ticket prices.  One might contend that the city specific effects belong 
in the attendance equation directly.  However, results for the price variable are more 
stable and more frequently consistent with economic theory when the city specific effects 
are in the first stage equation than when they are in the attendance demand equation.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the variables except the city 
specific dummies for all of Major League Baseball and for each league individually for 
the period 1969 through 1996.  GATE, SEAT, and NOLL-PAPPAS have fewer 
observations than the other variables because they are not available for the full sample 
period as was discussed above. 
 
Results 
In this section we discuss the results of estimating the demand for attendance at Major 
League Baseball games and the effects that labor-management unrest have on that   16 
attendance.  Table 2 reports results of instrumental variables estimation of the attendance 
demand equations for each of the three price variables when the four STRIKE variables 
are regressors.  The evidence of Table 2  indicates that  attendance demand is price 
inelastic, that attendance demand is persistent from year to year, and that the greater the 
on-field success the greater the success at the ticket window.  Stadium and franchise age, 
player quality, and the city's population base are also generally significant determinants 
of attendance.  Average income, racial composition of the city, stadium capacity, and the 
league the team plays in, are generally not statistically significant determinants of 
attendance. 
     Turning to the effects of strikes and lockouts, t he LOCKOUT variable is 
statistically significant i n the LN GATE and LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations.  This 
suggests that attendance is down by about  3 to  7 percent even after minor labor-
management dustups.  Recall that most of these events occurred during spring training 
and none caused cancellation of any regular season or post-season games.  Neither 
Schmidt and Berri  (2002; 2004) nor Coffin (1996) find these events to be statistically 
significant.  The estimates in the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equation seem the most reliable of 
the three.  The data covers three extra seasons relative to the LN SEAT model, and it 
covers several events whereas the time period for the LN GATE model only had one 
lockout.   
    STRIKE1 is significantly negative in  all three  equations.  The coefficients 
indicate that in the year a strike occurs attendance per game is lowered by about 12 to 13 
percent relative to the average attendance level through to 1988. Using the LN SEAT and 
LN NOLL-PAPPAS models, attendance rebounds the year following the strike to about   17 
6% above trend.  Using the LN GATE price variable, the only price variable that covers 
the 1994-95 strike, the evidence is that attendance fell by 24% in 1995 as a result of the 
strike of 1994-95.  Fan ire over the cancellation of the previous season's playoffs and the 
World Series is clearly evident in this drop off which is nearly double that for either of 
the earlier strikes.  Attendance appears to bounce back to the trend level in 1996, similar 
to the findings of Schmidt and Berri (2002; 2004), as the variable for the year after the 
strike is not statistically different from zero.  Interestingly, attendance dips below trend 
three years after the strike in both the LN SEAT and LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations, 
perhaps signaling some residual resentment on the part of fans about the previous strike 
as negotiations over the next collective bargaining agreement begin. 
  Tables 3 and 4 present results of estimating the models when each year of a strike 
is identified separately, followed by each of the next three years.  This approach allows 
each strike to be distinct compared to the approach reported in Table 2 where each strike 
had the same effect.  The disadvantage of this approach is that the variables indicating the 
strikes act very nearly like a set of year fixed effects so that interpretation of the effects as 
being the result of the strikes is problematic.  Consequently, the models are estimated two 
ways, once with a nonlinear trend as an explanatory variable (Table 3) and once with it as 
an instrument but not in the demand equation (Table 4).  The results are quite similar 
between the LN SEAT and the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations both with and without the 
trend variable.  Two differences of note are that the inclusion of the nonlinear time trend 
as a regressor results in 1) smaller price elasticity estimates which are no longer 
statistically different from zero and 2) the income elasticity has the wrong sign and is not 
statistically significant.  When the nonlinear trend is omitted from the equation, the price   18 
elasticity estimates are statistically significant and about the same size as those reported 
in Table 2.  The income elasticity in the LN NOLL-PAPPAS equations is statistically 
significant and about the same size as in Table 3.
18 
  Consider 1972 and 1981, the years the strikes occurred.  Attendance is lower by a 
statistically significant amount estimated between 10 and 12% for 1972 and between 11 
and 16% for 1981. By contrast, Schmidt and Berri  [Schmidt, 2002 #43;Schmidt, 2004 
#55] find no effect of the 1972 strike. Moreover, tests of the equality of the coefficients 
for 1972 and 1981 can not reject the null hypothesis despite the rather dramatic difference 
in the severity of the two strikes and the differences in when the two strikes occurred 
during the season.
19  The effects for 1973 and 1982 are generally not different from zero.  
However, when the nonlinear trend variable is not in the demand equation, the effects of 
1982 are positive and statistically significant.  One possibility is that these values reflect 
the strong economic recovery under way in 1982.  On the other hand, tests of the equality 
of the 1973 and 1982 effects can not reject the null hypothesis.  Likewise, equality of the 
effects for 1974 and 1983, and 1975 and 1984 cannot be rejected, indicating that the time 
path of the repercussions of the two strikes is the same.   Note that this  implies that 
attendance is affected by labor-management relations in the year of the strike and in the 
last year of a Basic Agreement between the owners and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association.  The result also means that modeling the strikes with a common 
STRIKE1, STRIKE2, etc., as in Table 2, is supported by the data.  
  The final set of results introduces forecasts of ticket prices as an explanatory 
variable. In this way, the data from 1969 through 1996 can all be u sed in the 
                                                 
18 No estimates are available for the LN GATE model as the price series does not go back before 1990. 
19 A table of the test statistics is available upon request.   19 
regressions.
20  Table 5 presents these results when the trend is included, Table 6 when it 
is not.  Note that the price and income variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in Table 6, and that price has the right sign and is significant in 
Table 5.
21  Coefficients on other variables are generally consistent with the IV results in 
Tables 2, 3 and 4.  The one clear exception to this generalization is the consistently 
positive and significant effects of BLACK INK.  These suggest that an additional league 
leading player raises attendance per game by between 0.5 and 0.7%.   
As for the effects of the strikes, the evidence i s that the strike and lockout 
variables are not all zero.  F-tests easily reject the null hypothesis for the regressions that 
include strike effects in either Table 5 or Table 6.  Of more interest is the question of 
whether the effects in the year of the strike are the same across all three strikes, as is 
imposed by the use of the STRIKE variables.  For the model that includes the time trend, 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same for the 1972 and 1981 
strikes, as before.  However, one can reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the 
same in 1972, 1981, and 1995.  The F -statistic is 3.28, with 2 and 695 degrees of 
freedom.  In other words, t he 1994-95 strike had a statistically different impact on 
attendance once the strike was resolved than had the earlier strikes, at least if the 
attendance equation includes the nonlinear time trend. 
                                                 
20 The equation for predicting the average ticket price has as the dependent variable the PAPPAS variable, 
in log form, and uses all the explanatory variables in the model and city specific dummy variables.  The 
adjusted R
2 for the regression is 0.66.   There are 39 variables, including the city specific effects, and 19 of 
them are individually significant at the 10% level or better, 11 of those are city dummies.  The others 
include log of population, percent black, log of stadium age, All Time All-Stars, Black ink, log of the team 
age, winning percentage, and a nonlinear time trend. Results are available upon request. 
21 The t-statistics in the table are conditional as the standard errors on which they are based have not been 
corrected for the use of the fitted price variable as a regressor.  The results are, however, generally similar 
to those of the instrumental variables estimates reported in the earlier tables.  Moreover, the corrected 
standard errors are only about 2.5% larger than the conditional ones, so the effects on t-statistics and p-
values are small.   20 
When the model does not include the trend variable, the results are different.  
Specifically, without the trend as a regressor, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the 1972, 1981, and 1994-95 strikes had the same effect on attendance.  The F-statistic 
for this test is 2.16, with 2 and 696 degrees of freedom. 
The years after the strikes are not statistically different from one another.  In other 
words, the hypothesis that 1973, 1982, and 1996 are alike cannot be rejected in either 
model.  It is also not possible to reject the null hypotheses that 1974 and 1983, the second 
year after the first two strikes, are alike, nor can one reject the hypothesis that 1975 and 
1984 have the same effects.  In other words, the effects of the two earlier strikes have the 
same time path until the next Basic Agreement, and the 1994-95 path seems the same 
though it is not possible to follow that path all the way to the next round of bargaining. 
 
Conclusion 
Major league baseball avoided a work stoppage during the 2002 season.  During the 
negotiations, a commonly heard statement was that baseball had never recovered from 
the strike of 1994.  Schmidt and Berri  (2002) published evidence from time-series 
analysis suggesting that the effects of strikes on attendance have historically disappeared 
in the season following the strike.  They suggested the same was true for the 1994 strike, 
especially if one looked over the period 1993 to 1996.  This, they say, is appropriate 
because 1993 and 1994 prior to the strike both exhibited very high attendance.  The 
results here bear out the point that strike effects do not carry over into subsequent years.  
The strike effects here are, on the other hand, substantially smaller than those reported by 
Schmidt and Berri, who find that attendance is lower by 30% in 1981, and by 35% in   21 
1994.  Moreover, the evidence here suggests that the earlier strikes, those in 1972 and 
1981, had the same consequences for attendance despite substantially different durations 
and games canceled. Additionally, the results of this paper indicate that the relatively 
minor labor management squabbles that we have labeled LOCKOUT had real effects on 
attendance in the years they occurred.  This is a new finding of this research. 
  There is also support in the evidence here for several other hypotheses about 
attendance at professional sporting events.  For example, the results here strongly support 
the link between success on the field and at the gate.  Teams with better winning 
percentages this year and that made the playoffs last year attract more fans per game than 
unsuccessful teams.  We also find that teams playing in older stadiums attract fewer fans.  
The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in stadium age results in between a .25 and a 
.5% reduction in per game attendance.  Additionally, the results suggest that teams that 
have been in existence longer do better at the gate.  There is mixed evidence on the 
effects of high quality players and on nostalgic effects in the last year of use of an 
existing stadium.   
Demand for baseball attendance is found to be quite price inelastic and it does not 
matter whether price is measured using  the seat price or the average gate approach so 
long as the estimation accounts for the likely endogeneity and measurement errors in the 
price series.  Finding demand to be price inelastic is a puzzle.  Most economists would 
agree that Major League Baseball has a substantial degree of market power.  That market 
power, it is generally asserted, would result in monopoly pricing, that is, setting price to 
operate on the elastic portion of the demand curve.  An important question for future   22 
research is, therefore, what explains baseball teams operating on the inelastic portion of 
the demand.   
  Did the labor unrest of 2002 have an impact on attendance?  The evidence here, 
that attendance is lower in the last year of a Basic Agreement, suggests that it did, even 
though the two sides ultimately resolved the issues without resort to a work stoppage.  
These effects are likely to have dissipated before the end of the season but may partially 
explain the drop in attendance of over 4.6 million, about 156,600 per team, from 2001 to 
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    MLB      AL      NL   
VARIABLE  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
ATTEND  754  22179.51  9282.30  395  20994.67  8739.93  359  23483.15  9690.52 
GATE  176  6.76  1.08  91  7.02  1.18  85  6.48  0.88 
SEAT  400  6.15  0.99  213  6.16  0.98  187  6.15  1.00 
NOLL-PAPPAS  471  6.05  0.98  251  6.07  0.99  220  6.04  0.98 
POP  754  3684.18  2447.92  395  3434.14  2283.17  359  3959.29  2592.68 
REAL INC  754  15296.65  2798.65  395  15379.62  2513.32  359  15205.36  3083.25 
PCTBLACK  754  13.73  6.44  395  13.16  6.83  359  14.35  5.94 
PCTHISP  754  8.76  9.19  395  7.46  8.27  359  10.20  9.92 
STAD AGE  754  28.86  22.96  395  34.16  25.52  359  23.04  18.08 
TEAM AGE  754  46.82  34.29  395  43.80  32.74  359  50.15  35.68 
LAST YEAR  754  0.02  0.15  395  0.03  0.16  359  0.02  0.14 
AAS  754  11.95  3.52  395  11.90  3.65  359  11.99  3.36 
BLACK INK  754  4.78  3.02  395  4.60  3.00  359  4.97  3.04 
WIN PCT  754  50.06  6.88  395  50.02  6.88  359  50.11  6.88 
LAG WIN PCT  754  49.94  6.88  395  49.94  6.91  359  49.94  6.86 
LAG PLAYOFF  754  0.17  0.38  395  0.16  0.36  359  0.19  0.39 
CAPACITY  754  51.38  8.85  395  50.76  10.25  359  52.05  6.93 
LN NOLL-
PAPPAS  471  1.79  0.16             
LN ATTEND  754  9.91  0.44             
LN GATE  176  1.90  0.15             
LN SEAT  400  1.80  0.15             
LN POP  754  8.02  0.61             
LN REAL INC  754  9.62  0.17             
LN STAD AGE  754  2.98  0.98             
LN TEAM AGE  754  3.44  1.04             
LN CAPACITY  754  3.92  0.18             
STRIKE1  755  0.10  0.30  396  0.10  0.29  359  0.10  0.30 
STRIKE2  755  0.10  0.30  396  0.10  0.29  359  0.10  0.30 
STRIKE3  755  0.06  0.24  396  0.06  0.29  359  0.06  0.30 
STRIKE4  755  0.06  0.24  396  0.06  0.24  359  0.06  0.24 
LOCKOUT  755  0.16  0.36  396  0.16  0.37  359  0.15  0.36 
NL  755  0.48  0.50               24 
Table 2: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Common Strike Effects 
 
 
  Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient  P-value 
LAG LN ATTEND  0.753  0.000  0.741  0.000  0.749  0.000 
LN SEAT  -0.248  0.044         
LN GATE      -0.214  0.089     
LN NOLL-PAPPAS          -0.236  0.003 
LN POP  0.042  0.065  0.059  0.018  0.030  0.136 
LN REAL INC  0.148  0.200  0.033  0.760  0.199  0.024 
PCT BLACK  0.001  0.643  0.001  0.684  0.001  0.490 
PCTHISP  0.003  0.136  -0.001  0.222  0.002  0.165 
LN STAD AGE  -0.052  0.007  -0.022  0.194  -0.051  0.004 
LN CAPACITY  -0.032  0.532  0.031  0.685  -0.056  0.235 
AAS  -0.002  0.573  0.006  0.069  -0.001  0.857 
BLACK INK  0.008  0.074  0.005  0.256  0.008  0.045 
LAST YEAR  0.037  0.622  0.162  0.078  0.027  0.721 
LN TEAM AGE  0.030  0.054  -0.006  0.728  0.037  0.011 
WIN PCT  0.023  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.022  0.000 
LAG WIN PCT  -0.013  0.000  -0.007  0.004  -0.013  0.000 
LAG PLAYOFF  0.062  0.035  0.023  0.502  0.085  0.002 
NL  -0.021  0.380  -0.007  0.729  -0.022  0.301 
LOCKOUT  -0.034  0.152  -0.066  0.017  -0.044  0.040 
STRIKE1  -0.125  0.000  -0.239  0.000  -0.134  0.000 
STRIKE2  0.063  0.021  0.030  0.424  0.057  0.033 
STRIKE3  -0.049  0.148      -0.060  0.058 
STRIKE4  -0.060  0.044      -0.072  0.009 
CONSTANT  0.817  0.489  1.640  0.062  0.546  0.559 
R SQ.    0.84    0.84    0.85 
OBS.    375    174    446   25 
Table 3: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Individual Strike Effects 
 
  Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient  P-value 
LAG LN ATTEND  0.707  0.000  0.709  0.000 
LN SEAT  -0.087  0.359     
LOG NOLL-PAPPAS      -0.074  0.421 
LN POP  0.065  0.008  0.048  0.024 
LN REAL INC  -0.080  0.542  -0.018  0.872 
PCT BLACK  0.001  0.676  0.001  0.585 
PCTHISP  0.004  0.020  0.003  0.028 
LN STAD AGE  -0.050  0.009  -0.049  0.006 
LN CAPACITY  -0.026  0.611  -0.042  0.386 
AAS  -0.002  0.533  0.000  0.954 
BLACK INK  0.008  0.073  0.007  0.049 
LAST YEAR  0.046  0.581  0.043  0.611 
LN TEAM AGE  0.020  0.200  0.027  0.070 
WIN PCT  0.023  0.000  0.022  0.000 
LAG WIN PCT  -0.012  0.000  -0.012  0.000 
LAG PLAYOFF  0.061  0.037  0.086  0.001 
NL  -0.018  0.439  -0.019  0.343 
LN TREND  0.065  0.005  0.067  0.001 
LOCKOUT  -0.041  0.195  -0.052  0.031 
y72  -0.107  0.003  -0.111  0.003 
y73  0.041  0.338  0.045  0.256 
y74  -0.088  0.084  -0.094  0.061 
y75  -0.110  0.007  -0.115  0.004 
y81  -0.155  0.001  -0.164  0.000 
y82  0.062  0.123  0.053  0.132 
y83  -0.046  0.290  -0.059  0.110 
y84  -0.049  0.272  -0.065  0.075 
CONSTANT  2.771  0.036  2.351  0.031 
R SQ.    0.84    0.85 
OBS.    375    446 
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Individual Strike Effects 
 
  Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient  P-value 
LAG LN ATTEND  0.735  0.000  0.742  0.000 
LN SEAT  -0.197  0.029     
LOG NOLL-PAPPAS      -0.217  0.010 
LN POP  0.050  0.035  0.032  0.109 
LN REAL INC  0.095  0.431  0.184  0.038 
PCT BLACK  0.001  0.653  0.001  0.482 
PCTHISP  0.003  0.100  0.002  0.156 
LN STAD AGE  -0.053  0.006  -0.053  0.003 
LN CAPACITY  -0.035  0.503  -0.060  0.220 
AAS  -0.002  0.600  0.000  0.943 
BLACK INK  0.008  0.068  0.008  0.037 
LAST YEAR  0.020  0.792  0.016  0.826 
LN TEAM AGE  0.027  0.080  0.036  0.013 
WIN PCT  0.023  0.000  0.022  0.000 
LAG WIN PCT  -0.013  0.000  -0.013  0.000 
LAG PLAYOFF  0.061  0.036  0.085  0.002 
NL  -0.020  0.387  -0.022  0.289 
LOCKOUT  -0.010  0.744  -0.034  0.154 
y72  -0.113  0.002  -0.121  0.001 
y73  0.012  0.769  0.024  0.557 
y74  -0.078  0.128  -0.093  0.070 
y75  -0.088  0.027  -0.101  0.010 
y81  -0.119  0.006  -0.144  0.001 
y82  0.104  0.007  0.080  0.026 
y83  0.000  0.999  -0.027  0.441 
y84  -0.008  0.851  -0.040  0.278 
CONSTANT  1.334  0.283  0.713  0.458 
R SQ.    0.84    0.85 
OBS.    375    446 
 
LN TREND is an instrument, but not a regressor.   27 
Table 5: Full Period Regressions with Predicted LN SEAT as Ticket Price 
 
  Coefficient 
P-
value  Coefficient 
P-
value  Coefficient 
P-
value     
LAG LN ATTEND  0.715  0.000  0.721  0.000  0.724  0.000     
LN SEAT 
(predicted)  -0.110  0.017  -0.096  0.027  -0.092  0.034     
LN POP  0.029  0.049  0.031  0.025  0.030  0.032     
LN REAL INC  0.014  0.805  -0.053  0.334  -0.032  0.577     
PCT BLACK  0.000  0.851  0.000  0.890  0.000  0.997     
PCTHISP  0.001  0.144  0.001  0.163  0.001  0.141     
LN STAD AGE  -0.025  0.003  -0.025  0.002  -0.026  0.001     
LN CAPACITY  0.002  0.957  0.014  0.703  0.007  0.842     
AAS  0.002  0.259  0.003  0.123  0.003  0.150     
BLACK INK  0.006  0.051  0.006  0.029  0.006  0.029     
LAST YEAR  0.132  0.002  0.127  0.002  0.124  0.002     
LN TEAM AGE  0.019  0.044  0.017  0.064  0.018  0.050     
WIN PCT  0.019  0.000  0.019  0.000  0.019  0.000     
LAG WIN PCT  -0.009  0.000  -0.009  0.000  -0.009  0.000     
LAG PLAYOFF  0.067  0.001  0.057  0.002  0.054  0.005     
NL  0.001  0.913  0.001  0.967  0.000  0.973     
LN TREND  0.060  0.000  0.059  0.000  0.061  0.000     
LOCKOUT      -0.047  0.006  -0.044  0.019     
STRIKE1      -0.177  0.000         
STRIKE2      0.034  0.094         
STRIKE3      -0.079  0.002         
STRIKE4      -0.091  0.000         
1972          -0.115  0.002     
1973          0.042  0.268     
1974          -0.085  0.016     
1975          -0.107  0.002     
1981          -0.159  0.000     
1982          0.056  0.105     
1983          -0.061  0.071     
1984          -0.065  0.053     
1994          0.015  0.655     
1995          -0.239  0.000     
1996          0.012  0.720     
CONSTANT  1.957  0.000  2.503  0.000  2.292  0.000     
ADJ R SQ.    0.85    0.87    0.87     
OBS.    725    725    725     
 
 
P-values based on conditional standard errors. 
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Table 6: Full Period Regressions with Predicted LN SEAT as Ticket Price 
 
  Coefficient 
P-
value  Coefficient 
P-
value  Coefficient 
P-
value     
LAG LN ATTEND  0.756  0.000  0.763  0.000  0.762  0.000     
LN SEAT 
(predicted)  -0.171  0.000  -0.155  0.000  -0.146  0.001     
LN POP  0.012  0.408  0.014  0.297  0.014  0.312     
LN REAL INC  0.154  0.001  0.087  0.056  0.113  0.017     
PCT BLACK  0.001  0.449  0.000  0.639  0.001  0.541     
PCTHISP  0.002  0.099  0.001  0.113  0.001  0.102     
LN STAD AGE  -0.023  0.006  -0.023  0.004  -0.025  0.002     
LN CAPACITY  -0.007  0.856  0.005  0.900  -0.004  0.905     
AAS  0.001  0.560  0.002  0.346  0.002  0.370     
BLACK INK  0.005  0.067  0.006  0.040  0.006  0.035     
LAST YEAR  0.111  0.010  0.108  0.008  0.105  0.010     
LN TEAM AGE  0.028  0.002  0.026  0.003  0.027  0.003     
WIN PCT  0.019  0.000  0.019  0.000  0.019  0.000     
LAG WIN PCT  -0.010  0.000  -0.011  0.000  -0.010  0.000     
LAG PLAYOFF  0.070  0.001  0.060  0.002  0.057  0.003     
NL  -0.001  0.956  -0.002  0.899  -0.001  0.928     
LOCKOUT      -0.043  0.012  -0.033  0.081     
STRIKE1      -0.179  0.000         
STRIKE2      0.040  0.047         
STRIKE3      -0.072  0.005         
STRIKE4      -0.081  0.001         
1972          -0.147  0.000     
1973          0.013  0.727     
1974          -0.092  0.010     
1975          -0.103  0.004     
1981          -0.142  0.000     
1982          0.081  0.018     
1983          -0.041  0.222     
1984          -0.049  0.147     
1994          0.028  0.407     
1995          -0.230  0.000     
1996          0.028  0.390     
CONSTANT  0.658  0.165  1.179  0.011  0.962  0.047     
ADJ R SQ.    0.85    0.87    0.87     
OBS.    725    725    725     
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